SORA SAIL III vs SAIL IV: what changes for BVLOS operators
Moving from SAIL III to IV raises the assurance bar, but the operational case—not ambition—should determine the target.
Build an audit around applicable requirements, evidence and live safety controls—not a checklist marked complete on paper.
An internal aerodrome safety audit should answer a practical question: can the operator show that applicable requirements are understood, controls work in daily operations and safety issues are being managed? A completed checklist alone cannot answer it.
Part-ADR applicability depends on the aerodrome and the operation in scope. Before auditing, confirm the current requirements, the aerodrome’s certification basis and any relevant national rules or conditions. An internal review can expose gaps and improve readiness, but it does not replace a competent authority’s inspection or determine regulatory compliance on its behalf.
Write down what the audit covers: locations, operational functions, documents, time period and responsible teams. Include interfaces that affect safety, such as maintenance, operations, emergency arrangements and contractors, where they fall within the chosen scope. Record what is excluded and why. A narrow audit can be useful, but only if its limits are clear.
Use controlled, current versions of the aerodrome manual and other relevant procedures. Identify the requirements that apply to this aerodrome and operation, including applicable Part-ADR provisions and national requirements. Check whether changes to the operation, infrastructure, responsibilities or approvals have altered the audit basis. Do not assume last year’s checklist is still complete.
For each applicable requirement, write a plain-language test and identify the evidence that would demonstrate it. Evidence may include approved documents, completed records, inspection results, staff interviews or direct observation. Note who owns the process and where the evidence is held. Keep a reference to the applicable requirement beside each test, so a reviewer can trace the basis for a finding.
Validate the checklist with the people who perform the work. Ask whether its wording matches the actual process and whether the evidence is generated in normal operations. If a procedure says an inspection happens at a set interval, for example, sample records across that interval and check how exceptions are handled. Do not treat a signed procedure as proof that its controls are working.
This is where checklist quality matters more than checklist length. A question such as “Is the process documented?” may confirm a document exists while missing whether staff follow it, records are complete or problems are corrected. Make the test specific enough to reveal that difference.
Sample evidence across shifts, teams and relevant operating conditions. Speak with staff responsible for the activity, then compare their account with records and what you can observe on site. Follow a control from instruction to execution and record. If the process depends on a handover, verify that information survives the handover. If a control is not in use during the audit, identify another reliable way to test it rather than marking it compliant by assumption.
Use a consistent method to record each result: the requirement, the evidence reviewed, the sample and date, the people or process involved, and any gap. Separate facts from interpretation. “Three sampled records lacked a completion time” is more useful than “record keeping is weak.” It gives the process owner something specific to investigate.
Compare the hazard log with incident and occurrence reports, audit findings, operational changes and safety actions. Look for risks that are missing, repeated or described differently across records. For open hazards, check that the risk assessment has a clear basis, mitigations have owners, and any decision to accept residual risk is recorded by the appropriate authority under the operator’s arrangements.
For overdue actions, establish why the date was missed, whether interim controls remain effective and who is accountable for the next step. For actions marked closed, inspect the evidence and test whether the change worked. Closing an action because a procedure was revised is not enough if the underlying hazard remains.
A structured risk review can help keep assumptions visible and field checks in the loop; the same discipline appears in this practical assessment of operational risk. Apply the method to the aerodrome’s own evidence and hazards rather than importing another site’s assumptions.
Before an external inspection, choose a few requirements and ask an uninvolved reviewer to trace each one from requirement to procedure, record, operating condition and accountable person. Ask process owners to explain the control without relying on a prepared presentation. Missing records, conflicting versions or uncertain ownership are useful findings, even when the underlying activity appears sound.
Classify findings using the organization’s established method, state the evidence behind each one, and assign an owner and due date. Prioritize issues by safety significance and regulatory exposure, not by how easy they are to fix. Then check corrective actions for effectiveness. A readiness review is complete only when the organization can show both what it found and how it addressed the causes.
North Sky Aviation Consultancy provides risk management and compliance consulting, regulatory compliance assistance, and aviation advisory services across the Nordic region and Europe. Organizations seeking support with EASA regulations or Norwegian aviation law can contact roe.nerem@northsky.no or +47 971 74448. The audit remains the operator’s responsibility; external advice should sharpen its evidence and decisions, not substitute for them.
Moving from SAIL III to IV raises the assurance bar, but the operational case—not ambition—should determine the target.
Fast-time simulation and airspace models can compare redesign options, but their value rests on transparent assumptions, credible inputs and operational review.
A practical C-UAS risk assessment starts with site-specific threat scenarios, evidence-led sensor choices and response steps that stay within lawful authority.